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In the terminology of classical signaling models we capture the impression that high types may send 
lower signals than low types in order not to appear too desperate. Overeagerness of low types or 
conversely modesty of high types can be described by our model. In contrast to the counter-signaling 
literature we require only a noisy one dimensional signal, where very low signal manifestations force 
types to execute their outside option. The central assumption is that high types are not only more 
productive when working for a firm, but that they also have a higher opportunity cost of doing so. 
Low types are then eager not to end up with their bad outside option as a result of a low signal 
manifestation. High types may exploit this eagerness by using lower signals (and hence a higher risk 
to end up with their own better outside option) in order to be distinguishable. Type dependent 
signaling cost is incorporated. It allows predicting when overeagerness should occur and when the 
classical signaling effect should dominate. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
“Barking dogs don’t bite“  
Proverb 
 
With his classical signaling model Spence (1973) illustrates circumstances under which rational 
agents should engage in a wasteful activity in order to distinguish themselves from less 
competitive individuals. In his terminology “high types” send a costly but non-productive 
“signal” that “low types” can not justify sending. Though hard to verify empirically,
1 signaling 
has been considered one reason for phenomena like people acquiring educational degrees, job 
candidates wearing a nice outfit for their interview, companies advertising their products or even 
evolution allowing species to develop seemingly useless features like the peacock its plumage. 
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useful comments. 
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1 See Weiss (1995) for a convincing attempt in the context of wages. 
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Surprisingly we sometimes observe ourselves reacting negatively to such signaling behavior. 
For example heavy advertisement of a product, say in the form of many friendly phone-calls, 
often does not lead to improving our view of its quality. 
Further more there is casual evidence that “stronger” signals are not always advantageous, like 
a survey by “Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln” concluding that multiple degree holders are 
not considered favorably on German job markets (iwd Nr. 46, 1995). 
If these perceptions are justified, we should find that sometimes the less competitive send 
stronger signals than the most competitive. 
Indeed Clements (2003) points out, that high quality products often come in cheap packaging. 
For example premium beer does not have the more convenient screw off caps found on low-
quality beer and in the US newspapers with high-quality content are sold in broadsheet format 
instead of the more convenient tabloid format.  
Hvide (2003) cites casual evidence of the most capable of students leaving or skipping college 
and going straight into business in areas where education is not a formal requirement for entry. 
For example Stanford University is known to have lost a substantial amount of students to the 
high-tech sector. Also Orzach and Tauman (1996) note that in the 1996 Forbes 400 list containing 
the richest 400 people in the US very many do not have any academic degree.
2 Furthermore 
Feltovich, Harbaugh and To (2002) point out, that in the US talented students (as measured by 
aptitude tests such as the SAT) tend to underachieve in terms of school grades. Similarly some 
luxury brands, like good wineries, hardly advertise at all.
3 And being “cool” is attractive when in 
essence it describes individuals who seem less eager to please or less concerned about approval. 
The impression we get when someone is too eager is one of desperation, while coolness or 
little eagerness are interpreted as strength: “The person does not need my approval” or “the 
company does not depend on my business” or “the applicant has alternatives to my job offer” are 
the kind of reactions invoked in us. They lead us to believe that the applicant is capable, the 
companies product of high quality or that the person has reason to be self-confident. Absence of a 
high signal can look like a sign of better outside options for the sender or higher opportunity costs 
of engaging in a relationship with the signal’s recipient. 
                                                 
2 In both examples the decision to leave school may have occurred after an employment option presented itself. 
However, if a good degree has signaling value even for successive employers, one could argue that such young 
professionals made the career decision to be better off without such a signal. 
3 A Cointreau slogan in Germany, rather paradoxically, reads “We are so good, we don’t need advertisement” (“Wir 
sind so gut, wir brauchen keine Werbung”). 
  2 
These examples are only suggestive, but the notion that “overeagerness” is often interpreted as 
a bad sign and that the absence of a signal can be understood as a positive indicator seems a 
conventional wisdom. The proverb “Barking dogs don’t bite” captures the idea well. “Boasting” 
as opposed to modesty has a negative impact on the perception of an individual’s capabilities. 
In Spence’s setup this is unexplainable. Low types should try to imitate high types as close as 
affordable. They will never send more of the costly signal, than high types. Of course various 
stories can explain some of the above. For example, returning to Spence’s terminology, education 
might actually augment competitiveness. Then, lower types might choose to educate more than 
higher types in order to compensate for their lack of ability.  
This paper tries to capture the notion of overeagerness originating from desperation or bad 
outside options and coolness or modesty originating from attractive outside options more closely. 
In particular it tries to answer the question “What could lead a low type to engage in unproductive 
signaling more heavily than a high type?” To be able to contrast the results to the standard 
signaling outcomes and to make them appear in familiar terms we stick to Spence’s terminology. 
First, we assume that high types have a higher opportunity cost of being employed than low 
types. For example high types could not only be more productive when employed, but also when 
self employed. Or they could have more creative and gratifying things to do with their free time. 
This assumption should have a lot of intuitive appeal. 
Second, opportunity costs are relevant: Very low signal manifestations leave individuals 
facing their outside option. The content of this assumption depends on the application: 
•  Most directly the signal amplitude might have to exceed a “physical threshold” in order to 
be detectable. 
•   A majority of the population might be of a third type that is not interested in sending a 
signal due to even higher opportunity costs for being engaged by the employer. Further the 
employer might not be able to “afford” making an offer to the whole society (e.g. there might be 
some fixed cost to every offer). 
•  Finally it could be that, though the whole society is composed of low and high types, only 
the sub-group of individuals who have a specific skill is of any productive value to the company. 
A majority of people does not possess this skill
4. This is convincing, if for example ability or type 
are thought of as exogenous or given by birth, while some basic skill has to have been acquired 
                                                 
4 This is equivalent to assuming three types, low, medium and high. Because in our model only the two higher types 
will have an incentive to be strategic, it is more convenient to think of high and low types that have a required 
unobservable skill and unskilled individuals in the background that may or may not be of either type. 
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over time and independent of ability. Further unskilled individuals would have to face a 
prohibitive cost for sending a high signal.  
We will phrase our model according to the last interpretation, but since unskilled individuals 
wi
isk for types to actually end up with a low signal manifestation. To that 
en
ures of the model make skilled individuals of low type very eager not to 
ap
 of a (type dependent) cost to sending the signal is incorporated. In 
sta
making the model more applicable. 
                                                
ll have no incentive to behave strategically, the above scenarios are equivalent and our model 
can address all of them. 
Third, there is some r
d we assume that individuals have only a noisy signal available to them. This, too, seems to be 
an unproblematic assumption. It rules out the unrealistic extreme case of no uncertainty in 
sending the signal. 
These three feat
pear unskilled, because they would face their unattractive outside option. So they tend to send a 
high signal to reduce this risk. Skilled individuals of high type on the other hand, are less 
concerned about being seen as unskilled, because their outside option is more attractive. If high 
types do accept employment, however, they would like to be distinguishable from low types so 
they can be rewarded according to their productivity. Hence, they may choose to send a lower 
signal, allowing some distinction between types, at the cost of increasing their risk to be 
perceived as unskilled. This is exactly the kind of behavior we hope to illustrate in some model of 
unproductive signaling. 
Spence’s assumption
ndard signaling contexts this assumption prevents low types from perfectly imitating high 
types. It drives none of the features of our model, on the contrary, if signaling is cheaper to high 
types, then the classical signaling effect compensates overeagerness. In our setup it is not even 
clear which type should incur the higher loss in utility from sending a given signal. For example 
high types may need to spend fewer units of time on acquiring a certain educational degree, but 
they might also value each unit of time higher due to their better outside option.
5 In particular our 
model applies to situations where cheap talk is possible for both types. However, accounting for 
type dependent cost of sending the signal allows us to predict when overeagerness should occur, 
 
5 Consider the example of advertising: Clearly it is easier to highlight the positive features of a high quality product. 
For example consumer tests can be cited etc. So the same level of advertising should cost less money for high quality 
producers. However, at the same time a high quality producer could make better use of every dollar he does not 
invest in a public advertising campaign, say by investing in the relations with his existing customer base, the same 
base that constitutes his better outside option to a successful campaign. Therefore, taking opportunity costs into 
account, it could even be that the advertising is cheaper for a low type. 
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The idea that signals are not always monotonic in quality is not new. It appears in models with 
explicit time structure. For example Teoh and Hwang (1991) show that a firm of high type may 
wi
oc
 consider type dependent preferences: if signaling brings a 
dir
tains 
ge more heavily in signaling than high types in any 
                                                
thhold good news from investors, while a firm of low type, with a bleaker outlook on the 
future, would disclose the same news. Orzach, Overgaard and Tauman (2001) explain how 
“Modest advertising signals strength”, if firms have multiple periods to sell a product and use 
price and advertisement expenditure as a two dimensional signal. When non-monotonic signals 
occur in the context of such multidimensional signals they are also referred to as counter-
signaling. Clements (2004) describes how the quality of a product’s packaging can be non-
monotonic in the quality of the product, if price is used as a signal, as well. For schooling Araujo, 
Gottlieb and Maureira (2004) address the observation that wages are non-monotonic in the GED 
of high school dropouts. Feltovich, Harbaugh and To (2002) show that signaling can be non-
monotonic, if another exogenous dimension of the signal is available. 
Our work differs from those papers in sticking to a very generic one dimensional noisy 
signal.
6 Of course low types would like to imitate high types in our model. Thus if any separation 
curs in equilibrium it has to be true that, taking everything but the wage upon employment into 
account, the cost a low type would incur when sending the signal high types send has to exceed 
the cost of the signal other low types send. This paper merely shows how the intuitive additional 
assumption of a positive correlation between type and outside option can reverse the role of what 
we think of as high and low noisy signals. We continue to refer to the signal with the lower 
probability of a low signal manifestation as the higher signal. When effort is costly this is also the 
signal bearing the higher direct cost. 
Benabou and Tirole (2004) construct a similar reversal of high and a low signals in the context 
of pro-social behavior.  To do so, they
ect monetary reward, then the most altruistic individuals may find it more costly to signal 
altruism, than individuals who are greedy. 
Section two of this paper introduces and illustrates our model of overeagerness and con
the general result that low types will enga
 
6 The story most similar to ours is that of Orzach, Overgaard and Tauman  (2001).  They propose firms whose 
production cost is correlated with their type. They assume given demand for good and bad quality and show that high 
type firms may advertise less. Their setup is different however: Firms set the price as a second dimension of their 
signal. Instead, our model accounts for noisy signals. Hence there can be partially separating equilibria, allowing us 
to meet the incentive constraint with a one dimensional signal. 
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eq
 c me. The senders will also be called applicants, the receivers 
firms.  
ithout this skill have zero productivity. 
*
uilibrium where high types do not send the highest possible signal. Section three considers a 
binomial distribution of signals as an instructive example. Section four concludes. 
 
2.  A Model of Overeagerness 
  
We onsider a sender-receiver ga
Some applicants have a specific skill which is essential to be of productive value to the firm, 
those w
There are two types of individuals in society: High types and low types. If they possess the 
required skill, high types have productivity  H θ + ∈   and low types have 
*
L θ + ∈   when employed 
by the firm, where  H L θ θ > . High types have opportunity cost  H v  for being employed by the firm, 
low types have opportunity cost v , where  0 >  and  v L HL vv > LL θ > eters are 
common knowledge
There is a continuum of potential applicants and common knowledge about the fraction r  of 
the population that po
. These param
. 
ssesses the required skill. The distribution of applicant types in the skilled 
fraction of the population is commonly known, too: The ratio of high types over low types isn.
7
Applicants have a noisy and public signal with support in [ ] 0,1  available to them. We assume 
for now that it is cost free. 
Applicants without the required skill send signals from a tribution with support 
* 0,s  dis ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦
where 1 s < . Let 
, 
* () fu s  denote the according pdf.  
Applicants with the required skill can choose the effort 
 
[ ] 0,1 e∈  they put into
aw according to the density function  ()
 sending the 
signal, which will then be a random dr ( ) e f s , where  f e s  
has full support for all e. Let  () e f s  satisfy the Monoto od Ratio Property (MLRP): 







f s ( ) e s
 is increasing in e. Also let  f
f
s  be continuous in e for all s. 
For  { } , iL H ∈  the utility of a representative applicant is 
                                                 
7 This is consistent with a possible correlation of “skill” and “type”, as the ratio of high over low types in the 
unskilled fraction of the population can differ from n.  Note again that this is equivalent to assuming there to be a 
third type of “very low” ability. 
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( ) i u acceptof w w fer =  
 accepting em w or 
 
from ployment at a certain wage 
 
( ) ii u w donotacceptoffer v =  
 
from executing their outside option. 
onsequently senders of i gnal have 
 the expected productivity of those accepting the offer. If 
indifferent between accepting and declin med to accept. The wage 
schedule offered by firms is  (
On the firm’s side there is perfect competition. C  a specif c si
to be offered a wage according to
ing an offer applicants are assu
[ ] [ ] ) ws, w:0 , 1 0 , H θ → . 
Applicants are concerned with their expected utility 
 
() ( ) () ()
Nash equilibrium then consists of effort 
choices () , LH ee  and lting wages for 
1
0
,m a x, ii e Uw e w svfs d s =∫ . 
 
A strategy is an effort choice e. A pure strategy 
(  the resu
*,1 ss ⎤ ∈ ⎦  are 
 
() ( ) ( )
() ()
HL eH eL nf s f s
ws








if high ty ept such an offer and  pes acc ( ) L ws θ =  if they would decline it.
8
For 
* 0, ss ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦  wages are spec e presence of unskilled 
applicants and whether or not the two   offer. The fraction 1 r −  of unskilled 
applicants is assumed to be large in the sense that any justifiable offer would be unacceptable to 
                                                
ified accordingly, taking into account th
types accept such an
 
8 Formally firms could be considered as players, too. But due to the full support of the signal distribution and zero 
profit they can be understood as a mechanism that rewards applicants. There is no out of equilibrium signal value. 
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both types. So  () L H ws v v << for 
* 0, ss ⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦ has to hold in equilibrium.
9 Expected utility then 
becomes  
 
()   () () () ()
* =+ , 
 where  () e
*
1
,m a x , ie i i e
s
Uw e Fsv w svfs d s ∫
s  denotes the cdf corresponding to  ( ) e f s .  F
 
Theorem 1   In any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the model, 10 LH ee ≥>≥  or 1 LH ee == . 
he intuition for this result was described in the introduction: skilled individuals of low type 
are
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider two cases: 
 
T
 very eager not to appear unskilled, because they would face their unattractive outside option. 
So they will tend to send a high signal to reduce this risk. Skilled individuals of high type on the 
other hand, are less concerned about being seen as unskilled, because their outside option is more 
attractive. If high types do accept employment, however, they would like to be distinguishable 
from low types so they can be rewarded according to their productivity. Hence they may choose 
to send a lower signal, allowing some distinction between types, at the cost of increasing their 
risk to be perceived unskilled. 
 
i)  Assume  H L ee > . The wage schedule can not be weakly increasing everywhere, since then 
low types woul te by playing  1 LH ee d devia = ≥ . So there are  12 ss >  with  () ( ) 12 ws ws < . This 
holds if and only if the wage justified by both types accepting at signal  1 s  is  e one 
justified by both types accepting at  2 s : 
 
smaller than th
                                                 
9 In specific it has to be true that high types want to deviate from accepting a wage justified by both types accepting 
and low types want to deviate from accepting a wage justified by low types only accepting it. If   denotes the ratio 
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⎝ ⎠  
for all  [ ] ,0 , HL ee ∈ 1  and 
* 0, s s ⎡ ∈⎣⎤ ⎦  is a sufficient constraint on r  to guarantee this. 
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This is a contradiction to the assumption. Hence there is no equilibrium with  H L ee > . 
ii) Now  assume  H L ee = . Then for  (









 has to 
be offered because of perfect competition among the firms:  ( ) ws θ = . Hence low types choose 
. Then   by assumption. So  1 L e = 1 H e = 1 HL ee = =  is an equilibrium for  H v θ ≥ . The wage 
schedule then satisfies  () ws θ =  for   and 
* ss > ( ) L ws v <  otherwise.      
 
Proposition 1   In every equilibrium with  1 H e <  there is 
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Remember   for all  () 0 ws=
* s s ≤ . Define  ( ) hs as the wage that would be justified, if both 
types accepted at signal  :  s
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Since  () e f s  is continuous in   for all  , so is  ( 0,1 s∈ ) e ( ) hs. Due to the MLRP it is decreasing 
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Proposition 2   An equilibrium always exists.  1 LH ee = =  is an equilibrium if and only if  H v θ ≥ . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
This implies that for  H v θ <  an equilibrium with   exists.  L ee > H










for all  , then  e H L ee >  would have to hold in any equilibrium. This is the way the Mirrlees-
Spence Single Crossing Property usually applies to signaling models. 
The equilibrium we find means this condition must be violated. In our model 
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2.1  An Example: Advertising 
 
  10 
Think of a bank trying to acquire new customers by sending out a brochure about their current 
extremely competitive credit offer. The informative part of the brochure has a table of numbers 
explaining the offer. Due to the many offers of such kind clients will only notice the offer, if the 
brochure is sufficiently appealing in a combination of aspects ( ). Imagine one possibility to 
make the brochure appealing is to announce giving away mobile phones to some readers. The 
bank does not know for sure, whether the brochure is already appealing enough to catch readers 
attention without the announcement. 
* ss >
Quality of a bank θ  is not determined by the credit offer only, but also by its service etc. 
Think of a high quality bank as one that can thrive even without such effort to acquire new 
clients, because word of mouth is another way for them to reach new customers (their outside 
option  H v ). However, they would still like to increase the number of their clients faster. 
A low quality ( H L θ θ > ) bank does not have word of mouth working for them ( H L vv > ). Their 
only option to thrive is to succeed in their marketing effort. 
In this scenario it seems reasonable that low quality banks would add the mobile-phone-give-
away to their brochure to make sure it is as appealing as possible: they want to make sure to 
receive attention (they expect to send a high signal  ). Then low frequency borrowers will most 
likely take the time to read the good offer and take it, as they have no alternative nearly as good. 
s
Naturally high frequency borrowers have established contact with another bank that may give 
them decent if not quite as competitive offers regularly. Thus high quality banks may distinguish 
themselves by not including a similar give-away on their brochure (they expect to send a lower 
signal). Even though the brochure with the give-away engages their attention, high frequency 
borrowers may rightfully interpret such a brochure as a signal of a low quality bank and borrow 
money from their alternative source instead.  
Thus a high type bank may run the risk of sending out an unappealing brochure that does not 
attract customers, but if it manages to create an appealing brochure without a phone-give-away, it 
attracts low and high frequency borrowers (corresponding to a high wage in the setup of the 
model). A low type bank may choose to make sure they reach the low frequency borrowers with 
bigger certainty and pay the price of not acquiring high frequency borrowers (a lower wage in the 
setup of the model). 
  11 
This story is intuitive. If an offer is too little about the product it does not seem serious, 
especially in banking. Yet the existence of all those offers in our mailboxes indicates that some 
people do accept them. 
More importantly the above scenario has close resemblance to a feature of a rare field 
experiment conducted by Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir and Zinman (2005) in South 
Africa. Without claiming that overeagerness explains their finding or that the description above 
does the complexity of their experiment justice, it is worth noting the parallels: They do find a 
negative impact of such a phone-give-away on the take-up rate among high frequency borrowers, 
while for low frequency borrowers they do not. So it does seem as if the give-away is interpreted 
as a signal of low quality among high frequency borrowers. They write that “… when we break 
up the sample into borrowing categories, we see that this effect [of the phone-give-away] is very 
large and statistically significant among the more frequent borrowers. For this group of 
customers, introducing this promotional feature […] in fact reduces the likelihood of loan take-
up. The nonnegative effect among the lower frequency borrowers may indicate that this negative 
choice effect of the promotional lottery may be offset in this case by an attention-getting-effect 
…” This matches the behavior we suggested for the respective customers very well. 
 
 
2.2  Type Dependent Cost of Effort 
  
Until now cheap talk was possible in our setup and the results can be interpreted as boasting 
versus modesty. Clearly a more general model would allow for a type dependent cost of the effort 
required for sending a certain signal, for example preparation for an exam. 
Signalling models typically assume the cost of sending a specific signal to be negatively 
correlated with productivity θ . And indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that high types would 
need less time for preparing a certain exam or in general send a certain signal. In our model, 
however, they also have a better outside option. Hence, the opportunity cost for spending a 
certain amount of time is higher for them than for low types. In our model both types draw their 
signal from the same distribution when exerting the same effort, so effort is measured as “output” 
in terms of signal send, not “input” in terms of time spend sending it. Hence opportunity cost of 
  12 
the time needed to exert a certain effort is the relevant cost. Therefore it is unclear which type 
incurs the higher cost of effort.
10
If the cost of effort is higher for low types we expect the classical signalling effect to compete 
with overeagerness. In principle incorporating cost into the setup makes the model more 
applicable and testable. It allows one to predict, whether or not to expect overeagerness. 
To incorporate cost of effort, assume that there is a function  ( ) [ ] [ ] ,: 0 , 1 0 , ce c →∞  with low 






















Whenever   in any equilibrium we shall say overeagerness dominates. For  L ee > H H L ee <  the 
classical signalling effect dominates. Whenever  L ee H = , we say there is perfect pooling. 
 
Theorem 2   In the model specified above there is  1 a <  sufficiently large such that for aa >  
overeagerness dominates. Furthermore if costs are significant enough in the sense that  ( ) 0 cc ′ ′ >  
for an appropriate c′, then there is  0 a >  sufficiently small such that for aa <  the classical 
signalling effect dominates. 












 and  H v θ ≥ . 
 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
Theorem 2 immediately implies aa ≤  with strict inequality for  H v θ ≥ . 
 
3. Binomially  Distributed  Signals 
 
As an instructive example that allows us to solve for equilibria, we consider a sender-receiver 
game as in section 2. Everything shall be as defined there, but we specify the uncertainty: 
Applicants have a noisy, public and (for now) cost free signal available to them. It will be 
called a test result. For simplicity suppose the test consists of an infinite number of questions. 
Each can be answered right or wrong. After the test is completed, two questions are chosen at 
                                                 
10 See footnote 5 to the Introduction for a more explicit example in the context of advertisment. 
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random for evaluation. So the test result  { } 0,1,2 s∈  counts the correct answers to the two 
questions considered. For applicants of either type that do not have the required skill, none of the 
questions can ever be answered correctly. Both types of the skilled variant of applicants can 
choose the rate at which they answer question correctly (say by putting marginal effort into 
studying for the test). Let  [ ] ,0 , LH ee∈ 1  be the efforts chose by the respective types. Test signals 
are then distributed binomially for skilled applicants: 
 
2
0 (1 ) p e =−   is the probability not to get any question right ( 0 s = ) 
1 2(1 ) p ee =−   is the probability to get one of the questions right ( )  1 s =
2
2 p e =    is the probability to get both questions right ( 2 s = ). 
 
For unskilled applicants the probability of  0 s =  is  0 1 p = . 
The wage schedule can condition on the value of  .  s ( ) 012 www w =  is the vector of 
conditional wage offers. 
For  { } , iL H ∈  remember that  i θ  was the productivity and   the outside option of type i.   i v
Let there be sufficiently many unskilled applicants of low type such that   has to hold as 
in section 2. Expected utility now is 
0 L wv <
 
() () () { } {
2 2




A strategy consists of an effort choice  . A pure strategy Nash equilibrium then consists of 
effort choices (  and the resulting wages are 
e
, LH ee ( ) 012 ,, ww w w = . Due to perfect competition 
on the firm’s side: 
 







HH H LL L H HL L
HL HL
HH LL H L
ne e e e ne e
we e wee
ne e e e ne e





are the wages justified by the average productivity of applicants with one or two correct answers 
(  or  ) respectively, if the offer is accepted by both types. The formulas make it clear,  1 s = 2 s =
  14 
that equilibria could be only partially separating again: The signal might be informative about the 
type it was send from, but not sufficient to determine the type for sure.
11
In the case types of productivity  i θ  accept neither   nor  , we assume   for tie-
breaking.
1 w 2 w 0 i e =
12 In case they accept only one wage offer  s w  and are indifferent to declining it we 
assume that they maximize the probability of corresponding outcome  . So only equilibria in 
which all players of one type act the same are possible: In case of indifference between strategies 
their behavior is unambiguous. Therefore mixed strategy equilibria are ruled out:  Mixing 
between   and   is precluded. Our assumptions also rule out mixing between accepting 
and declining. Then zero profit wages are uniquely determined by the ratio of accepting high 
types over accepting low types. Consequently optimal efforts 
s
0 i e = 1 i e =
H e  and   are also uniquely 
determined by utility maximization, as the expected utility is concave in the individual effort 
choice. Hence no type can be mixing over effort choices 
L e
( ){} 0,1 , , i ei L ∈∈ H .  So we can 
concentrate on finding equilibria in pure strategies. 
For this specific setup Theorem 1 implies 
 
Theorem 1’  In any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the model described above 10  
or  . 
LH ee ≥>≥
1 HL ee ==
 
The intuition for this result was described in section 2.1. 
The case   is equivalent to the equilibrium we would get for a binary signal  1 HL ee ==
{ } 0,1 s∈  where skilled individuals among both types are not distinguishable. Then high types 












≥ . This will be called “benchmark case” in the discussion below. 
Since we gave up the assumption of full support for the distribution of this discrete signal (in 
{ } 0,1 e∈  we have   or   respectively) we convince ourselves in the appendix, that the 
proof runs through as for Theorem 1. Proposition 1 concerning the wage schedule has its analog 
in  
0 s = 1 s =
 
                                                 
11 Out of equilibrium believes on the firm’s side can now be relevant only for boundary cases with  { } ,0 , HL ee ∈ 1 , 
where signals do not have full support. We will specify these believes in the proof of the fact below, which deals 
with these cases. 
12 A very small cost of effort would make this the only equilibrium choice. 
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Proof: In such equilibrium we have   according to the theorem and high types accept at 




In section 2 we showed for a very general signal distribution that in any interior equilibrium 
low types exert higher effort than high types. For the specific binomial signal distribution we can 
go further and ask for which values of  , , , H LHL vv θ θ  the possible boundary and interior equilibria 
exist. 
Normalize 1 L θ ≡ ,  . 0 L v ≡
13 Clearly there can be multiple equilibria for most parameter 
combinations, if we consider boundary cases: 
 
Fact   There are two possible boundary equilibria: The benchmark equilibrium   exists 
for 
1 HL ee ==
H v θ ≤  and   exists for  0, 1 HL ee == H L v θ > . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Consider briefly how robust the different equilibria are under small symmetric (with respect to 
type and direction) trembles (small uncertainties in the effort actually chosen): 
•  For  H v θ ≤  the tremble will eliminate the equilibrium with  1, 0 LH ee = = , because now 
the wage   becomes determined at  1 w 1 w θ =  and high types will react with choosing  .  0 H e >
•  The benchmark case survives for  H v θ ≤ , as  12 wwθ = = . 
•  Interior equilibria survive, because applicants maximize expected utility. In the limit 
“small” symmetric trembles do not change the expected utility for the respective types. 
Therefore we are mostly interested in interior equilibria. They are partially separating. The 
questions to answer are: How can those equilibria be categorized? Which parameter combinations 
allow the different types of equilibria? Are equilibria unique (apart from boundary equilibria)? 
Can we explicitly calculate those equilibria for specific parameters? 
                                                 
13 Formally we have only one degree of freedom left for normalization, as we already set the productivity of 
unskilled types to zero. Note well, however, that setting it to any negative value would not change any result. So the 
suggested normalization is valid. 
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The answer to the first question is obvious: Low types always work for  . For  12 , ww≥ 0 1 H e ≠  
we established that  . So high types either do not work at all or they accept to work only 
when offered   or they are willing to work for both,   and  . By assumption 
1 ww > 2
1 w 1 w 2 w 1 HL θ θ >= , 
thus consider ()  For ease of notation also fix the ratio of high over low 
types to be  ; other values give analogous results. Call equilibria where high types never 
work “No participation” (N), those where they accept   and   “Full participation” (F) and the 
ones where they accept only   call “Selective participation” (S).  
[ )( ) ,0 , 1 , HH v θ ∈∞ ×∞ .
1 n =
1 w 2 w
1 w
Note that we can rule out fully separating equilibria, where the signals and the acceptance of a 
certain offer are a sufficient statistic for the type of the applicants and in which at least some high 
types accept employment. If they existed, high types would have to decline offer  . Hence  2 w












 where  ( ) ( )
2 21 LL L L L LH Ue e e e θ θ =+ −  is the utility of an individual applicant of low 
type. So  0 LH θ θ −≥  would be necessary, which is precluded by assumption. 
 
Proposition 2’   For n=1 and  1 H θ >  a partially separating equilibrium exists for  ( ) H H vv θ < . In 
specific, with parameter dependent boundaries as given in the proof, the possible equilibria are: 
“No participation” (N)  
High types never work and  12 1, 0, , 1 LH L L ee w w θ θ ==≤ = =  is the unique equilibrium for 
() ( , HH vv θ ∈ ) ∞ . It exists for all  1 HL v θ >= . 
“Selective Participation” (S) 
High types accept only   and  1 w ( ) ( ) 11 2 ,1 2 , , , LL HH L H L ee e ww e w θθ 1 θ = == = =  exists as an 
equilibrium for  ()() ( , HH H vv v θθ ∈ ⎤ ⎦. 
“Full Participation” (F) 
High types accept both,   and   with  1 w 2 w 1 1 2 LH ee >>≥  and  12 1 L wwθ >>=  exists   for 
() (0, H vv θ ∈⎦ H ⎤  and possibly also for  ( ) ( , HH vv θ θ ⎤ ∈ ⎦. 
The benchmark equilibrium exists for  (0, H v θ ⎤ ∈ ⎦ . 
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Figure:  a)  ( ) LH e θ for S-equilibria;  b) Types of equilibria. 
 
Figure a) visualizes this result. Figure b) also shows the boundary  ( ) H v θ θ =   . The benchmark 
equilibrium exists for  ( H vv) H θ ≤   . Recall that in this equilibrium all low and all high types with 
the required skill work and receive the same wage. It is equivalent to the only equilibrium with 
working high types for a binary signal. For parameters  ( ) ( ) H H vv v H θ θ <≤    high types would 
never work with only a binary signal, while in the S-equilibrium half the high types will work for 




It remains to introduce a specific type-dependent cost to complete this example. Let 








ee e e →
∂∂




as required. Hence the model predicts, that classical signalling dominates for a  where  a <
(
2
1 ) H L av
k
=− − v , as established in Theorem 2 above. Note that  0 a >  for  () 2 H L kv v >− . 
 
                                                 
14 For example in  3, 1.3 HH v θ ==  a numerically calculated equilibrium is 
.  12 0.683, 0.838, 2.229, 1.799 HL eew w ≈≈≈ ≈
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4.   Conclusion 
 
The model presented here shows that high types may choose to send lower signals than low types 
in a framework very close to classical signaling models. Our predictions are driven by a 
correlation between an individual’s outside options or opportunity costs and its productivity for a 
firm and by the assumption that signals are noisy. Firms correctly interpret very high signals as 
overeagerness of low types, who are desperate not to end up with their bad outside option. Only 
high types can afford the risk of a very low signal for the benefit of not being seen as overeager, 
because if they do end up with a very low signal they have to execute their outside option, which 
is more attractive. 
Outcome and assumptions capture the common perception of overeagerness in different 
situations, so they certainly have intuitive appeal. However, the predictions, like those of 
Spence’s original model, will be hard to test, mainly because the effect is difficult to isolate, 
because there are few completely unproductive signals etc. In principle including type dependent 
cost of effort allows to predict when overeagerness should occur, adding testability. 
Consider the policy implications of the model for the context of workers applying for 
employment. For example if being educated is actually productive, then we may want to prevent 
high types from choosing less education or from performing below their potential. So we may 
want to prevent the kind of effect predicted by the model. This is a possible argument in favor of 
formal degree or grade requirements to entry into a certain profession: A prohibition of rewarding 
low signals as a sign of good outside options. 
From a social welfare point of view, high types taking the risk of executing their outside 
option have negative externalities for low types, who are paid less on average. If high types gain 
little from their behavior, this may be an argument for a society to prevent behavior as in the 
model, even if the signal is nonproductive. Cleary, if high types are more productive employed 
than self-employed ( H H v θ > ), society as a whole gains from high types always accepting 
employment. So if high types are willing to work for the wage justified by average productivity 
( H v θ ≥ ), then redistribution would allow for a Pareto improvement over the overeagerness 
outcome, if high types always worked. This might be another argument for formal degree or 
grade requirements or even for uniform wages. 
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On the other hand, in the example of binomially distributed signals, rationally rewarding low 
signals may allow signal specific wage offers to induce a proportion of capable individuals to 
work, who would decline employment at a uniform wage ( H v θ < ).  In this case giving up such 
formal requirements can lead to a Pareto improvement, as high types benefit and low types are 




Proof of Proposition 2: Define  () { , LH L H } X ee e e =≥  and consider the correspondence  [ ] [ ] :0 , 1 0 kX →× , 1
)
** ,, , , LH L LH H LH ke e e e e e e e =
*
 with 
, where  ()() ( () L e  and 
*
H e  are the optimal effort choices for individual low and high 
types given that everybody else chooses  L e  or  H e  according to their type. Note that  L e  and  H e  determine 
(
** , LH ) s ee  and that the wage schedule  ( ) , LH ee ws  dictated by  L e  and  H e  is decreasing on 
** * , s s ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . 
First show that  [ ] [ ] :0 , 1 0 kX →× , 1  is upper hemicontinuous. To see this recall that  () e f s  is continuous in e for 
all  s . Hence  ()
** , LH s ee  and   are continuous in  ()
L e, H e ws L e  and  H e  for all  ( )
** , LH s se e < . Therefore  


















ie e e i e e i e
s
se e
ei e e e e L
s
Uw e Fsv w svfs d s










,a r g m a x ,
L H
iL H i ee e
eee Uw e
∈
= is uhc according to 
the Theorem of the Maximum.  
Next we need to show that 
**
L H ee ≥ , which implies  . Then   has a fixed point in  : kX X → k X  by Kakutani’s 
fixed point theorem, which establishes the claim. 
Assume to the contrary, that one of the following holds: 
Case 1)  L H ee >  and 
**
H L ee > . Then 
** * s s >  has to hold, because otherwise  . Define 












. Note that MLRP for  e f  on [ ] 0,1  implies MLRP for  e g  on 
** * , s s ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ . Then the following 
statements are equivalent consequences of high types behaving optimally: 
() () () () () () () ()





** * * * *
* *
**
** * ** * *
HL
HH H LL L
ss
HH HL H H ee
ss
ss
HH ee e e e e
ss
Ue Ue w svfs d s w svfs d s
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Because   is decreasing and because  () ws e g  satisfies MLRP it must be that 








ws v g sd s ws v g sd s −< − ∫∫ * e
) () ( ) () () ( ) ( ** * *
** * ** *
HH LL ee ee F sF s F sF s −>−.  Further note that  ( ) ( ) **
** ** 11
HL ee F sF s −> − due to MLRP. Remember 
H L vv >  and  L L v θ > . 
With all this in mind consider low type’s utility from playing 
*
H e  and 
*
L e  respectively:  
 
() () () () () ( ) () () () () ()















L HL H H L L L ee e e
s
s
H HL LL L L ee e e
s
U e v w svfs d sFs Fs v v Fs v
ws v f sd s F s F s v v F s v U e v
θ
θ
−= − + − − + − −






H e  gives strictly higher utility to low types than 
*
L e ,  ( )
** , H L ee can not be optimal responses. This contradicts 
the assumption. 
Case 2)  L H ee =  and 
**
H L ee > . This implies  ( ) ws is constant for all 
* s s > . If  ( ) H ws v < , high types will never 
accept the offer and choose  . But then  0 H e = ( ) L L ws v θ = >  and low types choose  , hence  1 L e =
**
L H ee > . Else 
() H ws v ≥  and high types accept all wage offers for 
* s s > .  So  ( ) H ws v θ = ≥  will have both types choose 
.  This is an equilibrium if and only if  1 LH ee == H v θ ≥ .  
From Cases 1 and 2 we conclude that indeed   and by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, an equilibrium 
with 
: kX X →
**
L H ee ≥  always exists. The argument under Case 2 establishes that an equilibrium with 
**
L H ee =  exists if and 
only if  H v θ ≥ .      
 
Proof of Theorem 2: Define   as the wage offer justified if both types accept at signal  () hs
* s s > : 
()







nf s f s
hs
nf s f s

















 and  H v θ ≥ . 
 
Proof: Consider two cases: 
Case 1)  H v θ ≥ . For perfect pooling 
*
HL eee = =  for some   and consequently 
* e () () H ws hs v θ == ≥  for 
* s s > . So high types always accept employment for 
* s s > . This is an equilibrium if and only if  
( ) ( ) ( ) () ( )









ee F s v F s c e
ee F s v F s a c e
θ
θ
== + − −
== + − −
. 
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First order conditions are 












































<  as we claimed. 
Case 2)  H v θ < . Then given   high types will never accept employment. Hence  . But   
always holds. So no perfect pooling is possible.   
*
HL eee == 0 H e = 0 L e >
 
Claim: There is  1 a <  sufficiently large, such that for aa >  overeagerness dominates. 
 
Proof: Assume to the contrary, that for all   there is an equilibrium with  a H L ee ≥ . In such equilibrium the wage 
schedule is monotonic. As can be shown analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 there is 















* ≤ . 
Define  () { :, LH L H Ye e e e = } ≤ , the uhc correspondence  [ ] [ ] :0 , 1 0 , kY →×   1  analogous to  [ ] [ ] :0 , 1 0 kX →× , 1
)
 in the 
proof of Proposition 2 and  . We are searching for  () (
** ,: , LH LH ee k ee =   a  such that for all aa >  and for all 
we have  () , LH ee Y ∈
**
L H ee > . This would rule out equilibria where   H L ee ≥ . 
In equilibrium individual low and high types maximize respectively: 
   
() () () () () () () ()







He H e H e
s
LH eH L e eL L
Ue F sv F s w svg s d s a c e
U e U e Fs v v Fs Fs v a c e θ
=+ − − −
=+ − − + − − − −
∫
)
Now we will find bounds on 
*
H e  and 
** s : 
•  Low types will at least get  L θ  for 
* s s > . Therefore  ( ) ( )() ( ) { }
** :a r g m a x1 0 LL e LL
e
ee F s v c e θ ≥= − −− > . We set 
out under the assumption 
**
H L ee > . 
•  High types will never get more than  H θ  for 
* s s > . Therefore 
*
H H ee ≤  where  () ( ) ()
* 1
H He H F sa c e θ −= . 
•  High types need to gain at least the cost of their lowest effort. Therefore 
() () () () ()
** 1 eH HHL F sv a c e a c θ −− ≥ > e . This implies 
** s s ≤    where  ( ) ( )( ) () 1
H eH H L F sv a c θ −− =   e .  
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So we have bounded  [ ]
* , HL H ee e ∈  and 








 for all  .  () 0,1 s∈
Now consider  
() () () ( )
() ( )










′ =− − − − − −
∂∂ ∂ ) a c e  
With the definitions 
[] () ( )
, :m a x
LH
H eee cc e c
∈
′′ ′ == e  and  ()
[]
( )












 and  ( )
*,








() () () () () () ( ) () ( )
* 11
LH
HL L L HL
UeUe
v sva c v va
e
φθ φ θ φ
∂−
c ′ ′ ≥− + − − − ≥− − −
∂
 















. Clearly  1 a < . 
We also know that   is maximized in  () H Ue
*
H e . Therefore  ( ) ()
*
LH L Ue Ue ≥  for all 
*













, which implies 
**
L H ee > . This contradicts the initial assumption. 
Hence for all aa >  there is no equilibrium with 
**
H L ee ≥ . Overeagerness dominates.   
 
Claim: If costs are significant enough in the sense that  ( ) 0 cc ′ ′ >  for an appropriate  c′, then there  is  aa <  
sufficiently small such that for aa <  the classical signalling effect dominates. 
 
Proof: Define 




0,1 0,1 , ,1
:m a x m a x
ee e
HL HL HL e es s
FF F
cs v v s v s
ee e
θ
∈ ⎡⎤ ∈∈ ⎣⎦
∂∂ ∂ ⎧⎫ ⎧ ′ =− − +− = − − ⎨⎬ ⎨





Assume contrary to the claim, that for all   there is an equilibrium with  a H L ee ≤ . In such equilibrium the wage 
schedule is as in Proposition 1: There is 













* ≤ . 
Define  X  and the uhc correspondence  [ ] [ ] :0 , 1 0 kX →× , 1  as in the proof of Proposition 2. We are searching for 
a  such that for all aa <  and  () 0 c ′ > c ′  we have  () { } :, LH L H kX ee e e →< . This would rule out equilibria where  
H L ee ≤ . 
In equilibrium individual low and high types maximize respectively: 
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() () ( ) () () () () () () () (








Lee L e eL L
s
HL e H L e H L
U e Fs Fs w s vgs d s Fs v c e
UeUe F s v F sv v a c e
θ
θ
=− − + − − −




() () () ()
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) a c e ′ ′′ =− − − − + − >− + −
∂∂ ∂
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We also know that   is maximized in  () L Ue
*
L e . Therefore  ( )( HL H Ue Ue ≥ )  for all 
*













, which implies 
**
H L ee > . This contradicts the initial assumption.   
 
Hence for all aa <  there is no equilibrium with 
**
H L ee ≤ . Classic signaling dominates.   
 
Proof of Theorem 1’ Consider two cases: 
Case 1)  H L ee > . High types have to accept at least   or  , else we had  1 w 2 w 0 H e = . But then zero profit implies, 
that   has to be offered by the firms and   is surely accepted by both types. This implies low types maximize 
expected utility by choosing  . Since effort is bounded above by 1 we have 
2 ww > 1 2 w
1 L e = H L ee ≤ , which is a contradiction to 
the assumption. 
Case 2)   H L ee = . We know  , thus high types have to accept at least one offer to justify  0 L e ≠ 0 H e ≠ . Then 
 has to be offered  for   because of perfect competition among the firms. Hence low types choose 
. To satisfy the assumption we need 
1 ww = 2 1 L e ≠







 is an equilibrium for  2 H wv ≥ . 
Out of equilibrium believes of the firms have to be such that  1 ww 2 ≤  is offered.   
 
Proof of Fact There are four potential kind of equilibria where either  { } 0,1 L e ∈  or  { } 0,1 H e ∈ . With  [ ] 0,1 z∈ : 
i)   .  This is the first equilibrium in the proposition for  , LH ez e == 1 1 z =  and  H v θ ≤ : The wage   is only 
relevant outside the equilibrium, since nobody ever ends up with 
1 w
1 s = . It can have any value  12 wwθ ≤=  to support 
this equilibrium. So firms can believe that types are “equally likely” to send the out of equilibrium signal  1 s = . If 
they thought it was more likely to come from a high type, both types would deviate from  . For  1 e = H v θ >  high 
types will deviate. For   low types will deviate by choosing  1 z ≠ 1 L e = . 
ii)    is the other boundary equilibrium in the proposition for  , LH ez e == 0 1 z =  and  1 HL v θ >= :  2 1 L w θ = =  
will not induce high types to deviate and   is not determined, since nobody ever ends up with  1 w 1 s = . It can have any 
value   to support this equilibrium. So here firms have to believe  12 1 ww ≤= 1 s =  to come from a low type out of 
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equilibrium. For  1 HL v θ <=  high types will deviate. For  1 z ≠  low types deviate by choosing  . For  1 L e = H H v θ >  
this equilibrium exists for any out of equilibrium believes. 
iii)    has both types deviate by choosing  0, LH ee == z 1 e = . 
iv)     can be the equilibrium described in i for  1, LH ee == z 1 z =  and the one in ii for  . For  0 z = ] [ 0,1 2 z∈  
high types will deviate to   if  0 H e = 1 H wv <  and to  12 H e ≥  for  1 H wv ≥ .   12 z ≥  implies  , which makes 
low types deviate to benefit from  , since the first order condition from their utility function is 










.     
 
Proof of Proposition 2’ 
S)  For S-equilibria high types are to accept   and not  , thus  1 w 2 w 12L wwθ >=  has to hold. Clearly  L H v θ <  and 
H H v θ >  are necessary and  12 H e =  will result. To find all  ( ) HH v θ  that allow for S-equilibria, express  H θ  and  H v  



































to prevent high types from accepting  , because otherwise a firm could offer this wage and all high types would 
accept. Equivalently: 
2 w




























>=  the benchmark equilibrium exists. Then ( ) 2′  holds trivially and for 
( ) 1











=+ − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 
the constraint (  holds, too. Similarly   holds trivially for  ) 1′ () 1′ H v θ ≤  and for 
( ) 2













( ) 2′  holds as well. The expected utility of low types is  ( )
2




















as used above and consequently low types choose  L e  according to the first order condition 













ew e e e
e ee
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=− + =− + =
∂ +−
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Now the definitions of 
( ) 1
L e  and 
( ) 2
L e  yield an upper limit  ( ) L ve  and a lower limit  ( ) L ve  for values of  H v  































( ) H L e θ  is continuous and monotonous on  1 ,1 2 L e ⎤ ∈⎦
⎤
⎦  with values  [ [ 1, H θ ∈ ∞ , so the inverse  ( ) LH e θ  exists. 
Hence for any   and  [ 1, H θ ∈∞ [ ()( ) , HH H vv v θθ ∈⎤ ⎤ ⎦⎦  one interior equilibrium has high types accept only   and 
choose 
1 w
12 H e =  and low types choose  ( ) LH e θ . The resulting wages are  ( ) 1 , LH weθ  and  2 1 L w θ ==  as zero profit 
dictates. 
N) If  () H L vv e > , then high types are not willing to work for  ( ) 1 , LH weθ  as specified above. Because 
 is not an equilibrium for  1 HL ee == H v θ < , the unique equilibrium implied by the assumptions is 
21 1, 1, , 0 LL L H ew w e θ θ == =≤ = . We called it N-equilibrium. 
F) If  H H vv ≤ , then high types would deviate from an S-equilibrium by accepting the   that would be 
justified if all high types accepted it. 
2 w
Does a F-equilibrium exist for  ( ) H vv H θ ≤ ? If it does it involves  12 LH ee >≥. Note that  () H v θ θ <  for 
12 L e > . This guarantees  1 H wv > . Define the optimal effort choices of an individual in reaction to everybody else 
playing according to  , L H ee as   and  ()
* , LL H eee ( )
* , HL H ee e for low and high types respectively. Further define 
() () ( ) { }





LH L L LL H
HL H H HL H
ee ee eee




Clearly in equilibrium   and  () ˆ LL H ee e ∈ ( ) ˆ H HL ee e ∈  have to hold. With these assumptions and definitions the 
following lemmata hold. 
 
Lemma 1   For  () H vv H θ ≤  the set   is a function (it contains one element) that is increasing in  () ˆLH ee H e . 
 

















Note that, slightly abusing notation, 




2 22 22 ,
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as the wage   depends on whether high types accept it or not, which they do due to  2 w () H vv H θ ≤ . Also  1 H wv >  is 
guaranteed by the assumptions. Since for  12 LH ee >≥  we have  ,  12 ww >
*
L e  has a solution in (1 ,1 2
⎤
⎦ . It is 

















ww ww ee e
e ww
∂∂ − ∂∂ ∂ L = <
∂ −
. 
Hence  () ˆ 1 LH ee =  (since obviously  ( ) L identitiy e  is continuous, strictly increasing and takes all values in  1 ,1 2
⎡ ⎤


















ww ww ee e
e ww
∂∂ − ∂∂∂ H = >
∂ −
, 
establishing that  must indeed increase in  () ˆLH ee H e .    
 
Lemma 2 
 i)  In the above situation  ()( ) ( ) ()
** ,: ,, , LH L LH H LH fee e ee e ee =  is continuous for  () HH vv θ ≤ . 
ii) For the set    
2 Xε ∈ 
() () () {} 12
11









⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =× ≥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
∩ +  
there is ξ  small enough such that  : f XX ε ε →  for all ε ξ ≤  for  H v θ ≤ . 
 
Proof: 
i) For  H vv ≤  we know  2 H wv ≥  and then  f  is obviously continuous, since  ( )
* , LL H eee  and  ( )
* , HL H ee e are 
continuous in both arguments. 


















. Remember that 
* 12 L e ≥  and 
* 12 H e ≥  are guaranteed by the restrictions prior to the lemma. Choose δ  such that  21 ww δ =−  with  0 δ > . Then 










for low types and 





















for high types, since they may not accept  . Then zero profit determines wages to become  2 w
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for all  0 δ > , because all the contributing terms are positive due to the restrictions. 
 



















   >
}
 
Define  { 12 :m i n , ξ ξξ = .  Then  0 ξ > . As a sanity check observe that due to  1 H wv >  the wages that result from 
individuals adjusting their effort to a given pair of wage offers differ less than  1 HLH θ θθ − =− . Choose ε ξ <  to 
establish that indeed  : f XX ε ε →  with  Xε  defined as in the Lemma.     
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Corollary   In the situation in which both lemmas apply, there is at least one equilibrium ( , ) H L ee such that 
 and  . If ( (
* , HH L H ee e e = ) ) ()












Proof: Lemma 2 guarantees the existence of a fixed point of  f  in  Xε  for ε  small enough and  ( ) H vv H θ ≤  due to 
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. Any such fixed point is an equilibrium as specified in the corollary. According to 
Lemma 1   is an increasing function in  () ˆ . L e H e and any equilibrium has to be a value of this function. This 
establishes the second claim of the corollary.     
 
Now notice that  Xε  does not contain either boundary equilibrium. Also for  ( ) H vv H θ ≤  equilibria according to 
the corollary involve  2 H wv ≥ , as established under B). Therefore  12 H e >  must hold for high types optimal effort 
choice, where they accept both offers,   and  . Hence an F-equilibrium exists in addition to the benchmark case. 
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